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F ure, Ogus & Philipsen CURBING CONSUMER FINANCIAL LOSSESCurbing Consumer Financial Losses: 
The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement
 
MICHAEL FAURE, ANTHONY OGUS, and NIELS PHILIPSEN
 
This article deals with the question of how a high level of compliance with consumer
protection legislation designed to prevent financial losses can be secured. We use
a theoretical framework based on economic analysis of law to address some of
the key policy options, such as proactive and reactive monitoring, providing
officials with postdetection enforcement discretion, administrative, civil, and
criminal sanctions, and facilitating actions by victims and third parties. On the
basis of our theoretical framework and a classification of jurisdictions into
different groups (models of enforcement policy), we identify some key elements
of an enforcement regime and indicate in what circumstances a particular solution




There has been a sustained focus in the academic literature on the enforcement
of regulation for more than thirty years (Hawkins 1984; Richardson et al.
1984; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986; Vogel 1986; Ayres and Braithwaite
1992; Hutter 1997; Hawkins 2005; Yeung 2004; Baldwin and Black 2008).
Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly among socio-legal scholars, it
came close to eclipsing interest in all other aspects of regulation. In retrospect
it is not difficult to see why this occurred. There was a large disparity between
the number of recorded regulatory contraventions and the number of formal
condemnations, particularly criminal prosecutions, resulting from enforcement
activity by the relevant regulatory agencies, and this clearly required some
explanation. Regulatory scholarship, enhanced by empirical study, succeeded
in repudiating intuitive assumptions that this was a case of pusillanimity by
public officials or else the consequence of the excessive power of capitalist
industrialists in a corporate state. Rather, it was asserted that compliance
with regulatory obligations could, in general, be achieved without the heavy
hand of formal sanctions by means of a combination of information,
advice, persuasion, and (sometimes) threat.
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That this so-called “compliance” approach to enforcement was and is able
to achieve the regulatory goals more effectively than a “deterrence” approach,
which implies a more regular and systematic use of formal legal sanctions,
has nevertheless been assumed, rather than demonstrated and, within
recent years, regulatory enforcement has become a matter of more serious policy
debate. There has been a perception that, in the last decade or so, regulatory
agencies have been persuaded by government to adopt a more punitive
approach to enforcement (Simpson 2002; Baldwin 2004: 351). Whether or not
this perception is justified, it is clear that regulatory enforcement recently
has become an important matter of public policy debate as part of the





An important part of the debate has been to investigate how regulatory
enforcement might be made more effective. In 2005 we were commissioned
by the (then) UK Department of Trade and Industry to undertake a study
of the effectiveness of enforcement regimes of consumer protection regulation.
This was primarily a contribution to the program of examining best practice
established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Committee on Consumer Policy. We were invited to assess what
enforcement regimes were likely to be the most effective in preventing contraven-
tions of consumer protection regulations (resulting in financial losses only)
in the light of theoretical work on the impact of enforcement measures and




Our work took place at the same time as Professor Richard Macrory carried
out, for the UK Cabinet Office, a wide-ranging review across many different
regulatory enforcement regimes. He came to the conclusion that enforcement
systems should involve less reliance on the criminal law and a greater use of
administrative financial penalties (Macrory 2006), and, at the time of writing,




In other jurisdictions, too, there have been significant developments in relation




 Although the common
aim of this reform activity is for more effective enforcement, the discussion has
ranged over a variety of sanctions and procedures against a background of,
within the industrialized world, very different legal and regulatory cultures.
The task of our study was to determine what combination of sanctions and
procedures, in different legal and regulatory cultures, were likely to be the
most cost effective in achieving a high level of compliance with consumer
protection legislation aimed at reducing financial losses.
To acquire information as to enforcement practices in different OECD
jurisdictions, we sent questionnaires to members of the OECD Committee
on Consumer Policy. On the basis of the responses to this exercise, we identified
five models of enforcement (see Section II below). We then selected four
case studies in order to study these different models of enforcement in more
detail (one of the case studies covering two of the models), supplemented by
information obtained via interviews with officials.
 




© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy
 
For the theoretical perspective, we adopted an economic deterrence frame-
work, derived from the basic model that Gary Becker formulated for the
criminal law (Becker 1968: 169) and which has given rise to a very substantial
literature (Eide 2000: 345–89; Polinsky and Shavell 2000: 38, 45). This is
predicated on the assumption that individuals and firms will comply with the
law if the costs incurred by them from contravening it (including notably
any sanctions imposed) will exceed the benefits they derive from the contra-
vention. As we shall see, the economic analysis focuses on how different
approaches to key variables, such as the probability of a contravention being
detected, the type of sanction imposed, and the procedural requirements for
establishing liability for such sanctions, impact on the predictions of
compliance derived from the model. And since those different approaches
generate different levels of costs, particularly for the public purse, the analysis
can make an important contribution to enforcement policymaking, in that
it indicates how limited resources can be allocated so as to maximize the
benefits to society arising from regulatory compliance—what is generally
referred to as “cost effectiveness” analysis (Ogus 2006: 290–92).
Drawing on our OECD study, our aim in this article is to show how the
economic framework can be used to make a meaningful contribution to the
policy debate about appropriate enforcement systems. In Section II, we
describe in more detail the five models and show how they address the key
issues. Section III is devoted to the theoretical economic framework; and, in
the remainder of the article, we draw from that framework implications for
different dimensions of enforcement policy: the targeting of enforcement
interventions (Section IV); self-regulation and alternative dispute resolution
(Section V); procedures and processes (Section VI); and actions by victims
and third parties (Section VII).
 
II. MODELS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY
 
As stated above, for our OECD survey we obtained information from responses
to questionnaires sent to representative officials in a large number of OECD
jurisdictions. This related to enforcement law and practice in the following
areas: monitoring of trader behavior, procedures following detection of
contraventions, availability of sanctions (administrative, civil, or criminal)
and procedures for these sanctions, and enforcement by consumers. On the
basis of this information we were able to identify some key characteristics
of enforcement. Moreover, because some patterns seemed to emerge, we were
able to classify the responding jurisdictions into five groups, that is, five different
models of enforcement policy. These models reflected the key characteristics
of our investigations, notably whether a public agency engages in proactive
monitoring of traders and whether financial penalties are imposed as a
consequence of primarily administrative, civil, or criminal procedures (Faure,
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1. Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree of monitoring and invest-
igation by administrative agencies and, for the purposes of punishment
and deterrence, there is reliance on the possibility of penalties being
imposed as a result of criminal justice proceedings.
2. Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree of monitoring and in-
vestigation by administrative agencies but efforts to secure compliance are
focused on agencies taking proceedings against traders in the civil courts,
although this does not preclude the possibility of criminal prosecutions.
3. Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree of monitoring and
investigation by administrative agencies and they themselves have the
power to impose (generally modest) financial penalties. This does not pre-
clude the possibility of criminal prosecutions or civil proceedings.
4. Jurisdictions in which a public institution (such as an Ombudsman) exists
to receive complaints from consumers and third parties, and that agency
may be instrumental in initiating proceedings in a civil court or referring
the case for prosecution in the criminal courts.
5. Jurisdictions in which there is little or no monitoring of traders by an
administrative agency, and it is mainly left to the consumers, aided by
voluntary or publicly funded consumer associations, to enforce private
rights against defaulting traders, or else to resort to self-regulatory dispute
settlement processes. Administrative and/or criminal proceedings by a
residual, public enforcement agency are taken only in exceptional cases.
To some extent these classifications reflect different legal traditions (as
regards the judicial and administrative framework) and cultures (e.g., with
respect to the role of the consumer), so that, for example, Anglophone/
common law jurisdictions tend to adopt mainly models (1) and (2), former
members of the East-European bloc model (3), Scandinavian countries
model (4), and Germanic countries model (5).
In our report for OECD, we undertook case studies in four jurisdictions,
to explore in greater depth the key characteristics of the different models of
enforcement policy. In the following paragraphs, only some key points that
emerged from these case studies will be presented. In later sections of this
article, we will take a closer look at several more specific aspects of these
case studies.
The United Kingdom was selected as an example of model (1), that is,
primarily relying on the criminal justice system for financial penalties. We
found that enforcement procedures were considered in general to be effective.
However, there was perceived to be inadequate deterrence for serious cases
in the United Kingdom, because the penalties imposed by the criminal
courts were too low, and no adverse financial consequences were attached
to enforcement orders obtained in civil proceedings. The view of officials,
that the introduction of a suitable system of administrative financial penalties
would enhance compliance, anticipated the conclusions of the Macrory Report
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Australia was selected as an example of model (2) where administrative
agencies use primarily the civil justice system to impose sanctions. We found
that civil proceedings were (considered to be) an effective way of stopping
illegal conduct by recalcitrant traders and achieving timely redress for consumers.




 and adverse publicity were regarded
as important devices for inducing compliance. The Australian civil regime
does not allow the courts to impose financial penalties: although officials
have been considering the possible introduction of civil pecuniary penalties
for contraventions of consumer protection legislation, currently such penalties
can only be pursued through criminal prosecution. In Australia, criminal
sanctions are reserved for the most serious contraventions of the law. However,
they were not generally considered an effective mechanism for achieving
timely consumer redress because of the additional time and complexity
associated with criminal prosecution.
Belgium was selected as an example of model (3) in which administrative
agencies have power themselves to impose financial penalties. A first key
point that emerged from our study is that the “transaction,” that is, an
administrative financial imposition, is considered to be an easy and low-cost
means of dealing with consumer protection offenses. Furthermore, the ability
of the criminal process to operate effectively in relation to cases appropriate
for the process is perceived to be hampered by inadequate resources in the
prosecution service and by the fact that some of the cases referred to that service
could more appropriately be resolved in the civil courts.
The common feature of models (4) and (5), those primarily relying on
consumer complaints to an ombudsman and those primarily relying on self-
regulatory arrangements and the enforcement of private rights, is that they





 For the fourth jurisdiction, reflecting this dominant characteristic
of both models (4) and (5), we selected the Netherlands. The Dutch system
works well where contraventions are easily detected and where traders are
“benevolent.” Industry self-regulatory compliance schemes can play an
important complementary and cost-effective role to consumer policy enforcement
regimes. Nevertheless, there was perceived to be inadequate deterrence for
“mala fide” traders. It should be noted though that since 2007 a new
administrative agency has been granted some powers to impose financial




In this section we provide a short summary of the economic literature on
regulatory enforcement, in order to be able to develop a theoretical frame-
work that can be used to predict when traders are likely to comply with the
law. Following Becker’s study of the criminal law (1968), this economic literature
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law when the costs that they expect to incur if their unlawful act is detected
and pursued will exceed the expected benefits that will accrue from the
unlawful act. Naturally, the costs generated by the various enforcement
policy options should be considered as well. The costs consist of (1) the
administrative costs of using the particular enforcement advice and (2) the
“error costs,” that is, the adverse consequences to particular individuals and
to society more generally if the processes generate some inappropriate con-
demnations and sanctions. With regard to error costs there is a well-known
distinction between Type I errors, wrongfully convicting the innocent, and
Type II errors, not convicting the guilty. Because the criminal justice system
in particular is designed to reduce Type I errors (thereby increasing the
probability of Type II errors), error costs are especially important when
comparing administrative, civil, and criminal systems. In this section we
also recapitulate on the cost-benefit approach (which identifies optimal
levels of enforcement) and the cost-effectiveness approach (which takes a
high level of enforcement as its goal). In our analysis below (Section IV and






A. A SIMPLE MODEL OF DETERRENCE AND COMPLIANCE
 
In Becker’s (1968) model of deterrence, individuals and firms will be
induced to comply with the law if their (expected) costs of contravening the
law exceed the benefits to them of the contravention. The expected costs




























should be noted that the costs for traders arising from contraventions are




, legal defense expenditures, utility losses arising from encounters




Some of these costs will be incurred regardless of whether there has been a
formal conviction. Taking this into account, the condition of compliance
can be rewritten as follows: 
 






 represents the prob-








depends in particular on the amount and quality of monitoring of traders
by enforcement agencies, the involvement of consumers, and the involvement




 is influenced by factors such as the requirements for formal hearings and
proof of contravention (including burden of proof and powers to obtain
required evidence), and proof of fault or knowledge.
This simple model of deterrence assumes that likely offenders behave
rationally and have full information on the values of the different variables.
The assumption of rational behavior can generally be regarded as plausible
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within the context of “white-collar crime,” including contraventions of con-




 Indeed, it appears to make
sense for policymakers to design enforcement systems having regard to the
generality of behavior to be expected. The lack-of-information problem,
however, may be more serious, in particular where it concerns information








) and on the formal

















 below the actual value, results in undercompliance,
whereas the opposite case would of course lead to overcompliance. Hence,
providing information on the law and its sanctions may become an important
strategy in order to reduce such problems of underdeterrence or overdeter-
rence. Polinsky and Shavell argue that, to predict how individuals behave,
what is relevant is not the actual probability and magnitude of a sanction,
but the perceived levels or distributions of these variables (2000: 325–26).
 
B. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENFORCEMENT REGIMES
 
In the literature, a distinction is generally made between a cost-benefit
approach and a cost-effectiveness approach. In a cost-benefit approach, the
optimal level of enforcement is identified by comparing costs and benefits.





) and costs (administrative and error costs) may prove to be










) in terms of achieving increased levels of compliance of the different
enforcement policy options. As far as costs are concerned, the two categories
of costs mentioned above are relevant. First, there are the administrative






), most of which fall
ultimately on taxpayers. It is clear that some criminal penalties, such as
imprisonment, are more expensive to apply than administrative or civil penalties.
However, also the process costs are higher: the procedural requirements of
criminal liability make it much more costly than administrative and civil






): costs arising from the
fact that procedures and institutions are not perfect, and some decisions





 It is therefore important to secure some form of
trade-off between administrative costs (notably process costs) and error costs.
A cost-effectiveness approach takes a high enforcement level as the goal.
Then the important policy question is how this level of enforcement can be
achieved at least cost. While the aim of our OECD project was indeed to
assess the effectiveness of enforcement regimes in achieving a high degree of
compliance with consumer protection regulation, here we also consider the
question whether the benefits of regulatory enforcement are high or low.
From the information we acquired on the regimes in different jurisdictions,
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arrangements. These will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Applying the simple theoretical framework to the different enforcement
policy options makes it possible to hypothesize on how decisions on these
















. To do this, the administrative
and error costs incurred in exercising the option must be compared with the
benefits, primarily in the form of increased compliance. Clearly, in order to

















, empirical data on these variables are needed. Although
for our study reliable data were not available (not even on administrative
costs), it has been possible, as we will see in the following sections, to reach
some intuitive predictions.
 
IV. TARGETING ENFORCEMENT INTERVENTIONS
A. MONITORING MODELS
 
With regard to the monitoring of traders, jurisdictions vary in their
approaches. For example in Australia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom
publicly financed institutions adopt a proactive approach. In other jurisdictions,





adopt a reactive approach, relying largely on responding to the complaints
of consumers and third parties.
What can be said concerning this choice between proactive or reactive
monitoring from an economic perspective? The relevant question in terms











 (probability and costs of




 (probability and costs of a
formal sanction being imposed). Generalizations seem difficult because the
relative merits of the two approaches are likely to depend much on circum-
stances arising in particular jurisdictions, including their institutional
arrangements and their consumer protection culture. Nevertheless, it seems
possible to identify a few indicators to predict when the one or the other
approach may be more effective in curbing contraventions of consumer
protection legislation.
A first indicator is whether, in the particular jurisdiction, an active consumer
culture exists and whether there is an already existing agency network. The
relevance of the latter is that a proactive approach requires significant
resources to be available to public agencies. However, the marginal costs of
those resources are likely to be smaller, and therefore the argument for the
proactive approach more powerful, if an agency network already exists for
other purposes. To similar effect, the reactive approach is plausible in
countries (such as the Netherlands) where there is a culture of consumer
activism. This is likely to be the case where consumer associations and the
like, whether voluntarily or publicly funded, have a major profile in the
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sense both that consumers will be sufficiently aware of their existence in
order to refer cases to them, and that the institutions themselves take the
initiative in publicizing potential problems and seeking out defaulting





ever, this assumes that the consumer institutions are effectively able and
likely to take action against defaulting traders, which may not always be
the case, particularly if enforcement powers are misused for opportunistic
reasons (Schäfer 2000: 183–213; Van den Bergh 2007).
A second indicator relates to the nature of the consumer protection
measure in question. In relation to those that most consumers will them-








, and thereby also to deterrence. Examples include unsound invest-
ment advice by a financial consultant, nontransparent price calculations
(Van den Bergh 2007: 186) and “signing-without-reading” standard form
contracts (De Geest 2002: 213–325). These can be contrasted with contra-
ventions on which consumers are likely to be much better informed, for
example, those giving rise to a disappointing holiday (Van den Bergh 2007:
195). The information characteristics of the latter cases provide, indeed, an
indicator not only for reactive monitoring, but also for the possibility the private
enforcement might, more generally, be preferable, a dimension that we con-
sider in Section VII of this article.
A third indicator is the information available to firms concerning the





 enforcement will impose costs on them that could have been




 monitoring regime. In such circumstances, proactive
monitoring can serve to educate a proportion of the relevant traders as to
what is needed to comply with the law, and this can also enhance further
compliance.
The latter argument derives some support from studies of enforcement
styles. It appears that many violations of regulation are not intentional, but
rather result from lack of information or knowledge. In such cases a proactive
approach has the advantage that, through education and information pro-
vision, firms (who may not even have been aware that they were violating)
can be led toward compliance (Fenn and Veljanovski 1988: 1055–70). Thus,
a system of proactive monitoring of traders by public authorities is likely to
be cost effective when there is not a significant culture of proactive complaints
by consumers and consumer associations within the jurisdiction, where the
contravention is unlikely to be easily detected by the consumers themselves,
and where information costs for traders are high.
It equally follows that there is likely to be a significant enforcement deficit
and thus underdeterrence in those jurisdictions adopting a reactive approach in
relation to consumer protection contraventions that are not easily detectable
(Van den Bergh 2007: 191). This was a serious weakness in the Netherlands
before the introduction of the consumer authority. Even difficult to detect
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 In such jurisdictions,
the question also arises as to how well the complaints and dispute-resolution
procedures perform in inducing compliance. However, even if the systems
are effective, the weakness remains that they only react after the harm





The cost effectiveness of proactive monitoring can moreover be enhanced
by the adoption of risk-assessment models such as those used in the United
Kingdom (Howells 2007: 63–80). Targeted enforcement has the advantage




) for each unit of input but can




Nevertheless, it is important that any such targeting be based on objective
rather than subjective criteria, since the latter may too easily permit the
intrusion of political and other undesirable considerations into the appraisal.
The objective criteria would include, for example, the number of complaints
relating to particular categories of trader as well as cases where, because of





When an agency believes that a contravention has taken place, it typically
has a wide range of enforcement options, from taking no action other than
an informal warning, to issuing a formal warning, to initiating administrative,
civil, or criminal procedures. It appears that the only plausible argument for
denying enforcement agencies the discretion as to whether or not to initiate an
enforcement action, and in what form, is derived from concerns with
problems concerning the transparency and accountability of officials, in
short where discretion can be abused.
The question of discretion is strongly linked to a debate in the enforcement
literature between advocates of the deterrence model (who would limit
agency discretion) and advocates of a cooperative enforcement style (which
relies on negotiations between the agency and the regulated and for which,
therefore, discretion is important). Although it is of course not difficult to





 a pure deterrence approach, which would eliminate
all agency discretion cannot be cost effective (Hawkins 1984). A cooperative
strategy can be qualified as a “soft” approach that may endanger the goal
of optimal deterrence (see also Van den Bergh 2007: 197), but the main reason
for allowing agency discretion is related to the high costs to the enforcing
agency in bringing a case to court (Ogus and Abbot 2002: 293). Of course,
the agency’s discretion can also have disadvantages. Discretion may be very
costly to the agency (e.g., if discretion leads to a larger number of appeals).
There are two strong cost-effectiveness arguments for discretion. First,
although the automatic pursuit of enforcement measures obviously raises
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, and therefore, under the deterrence model, should increase
compliance, the social benefit of such increased compliance in relation to
trivial contraventions is relatively small. Proceeding with trivial cases in this






), because traders will sustain
significant “indignation costs” that may motivate them to initiate appeals
against decisions (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Second, dismissing the case—





increase compliance, but it should generate significant benefits in terms of
educating these traders, and this should indirectly improve future compliance.
Thus, the agency can improve the knowledge of market participants by giving
opinions on the legality of certain practices (see also Van den Bergh 2007:
201). Furthermore, if the exercise of these options is followed by increased





, because, for these offenders, the chance




) will have a much higher value (Fenn and Veljanovski
1988: 1055).
The cost effectiveness of these options depends crucially on the relative
importance of inducing compliance by first-time and second-time offenders,
respectively. If, as is typically the case with consumer protection regulation
dealing exclusively with financial losses, relatively small amounts of harm
result from individual contraventions, and the problem is mainly with those
traders who are regular offenders, then the discretion not to engage in an
enforcement regime, if wisely exercised, is of great importance. A trader
responsible for a single, and perhaps accidental, contravention will lose
little, and may gain, through being better informed; the repeat offender is
more likely to be caught and the subject of a formal condemnation.
It may therefore be concluded, that, unless there are justified fears that
officials might abuse discretion, it is cost effective for agencies to have the
power to choose between dismissing a case (with or without a warning) and
initiating enforcement procedures. This accords with the more general insight
from the law and economics literature (ibid.) and from the environmental
area (Heyes and Rickman 1999: 361–78) that, given limited agency resources
for inspections, it is cost effective for enforcement agencies to use tolerance
in some contexts (first offenders) and increasing coercion in others (second
offenders).
 
V. SELF-REGULATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
 
As we have seen, model (5) adopts a strategy that, because of its heavy reliance
on the activism of consumers themselves and/or associations representing
their interests, as well as the readiness of traders to reach solutions through
self-regulatory mechanisms, involves a much reduced role for public institutions.
This leads to a first observation, that if such a system is able to achieve
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cost than if public enforcement processes are invoked. A second, related
point is that, since consumers and consumer associations have an interest in
the outcome of the case, they are motivated to pursue it in an efficient way;
officials of public enfofircement agencies do not have the same motivation,
because they do not need to balance the benefits of enforcement against the
costs (Landes and Posner 1975: 1). Of course, as we have seen in Section
IV, the benefit of such motivation may be outweighed by the costs to the
private parties of having information concerning the contravention, and of
taking the initiative in pursuing a claim against the trader. This advantage
to private enforcement is therefore likely to apply only in jurisdictions with
a culture of proactive consumerism.
The absence of a formal public process and sanction also means that the
costs to be incurred by the trader following contravention, particularly
those associated with D, are less explicit. It is important, therefore, to consider
under what conditions these self-regulatory procedures can generate ade-
quate deterrence (Hadfield 2001: 40). The first is obvious but needs to be
stated. Systems of self-voluntary regulation will emerge in particular indus-
tries only when it is in the interest of members of that industry to have
them (Gupta and Lad 1983: 416). This might be because the system
increases overall demand for the industry’s product by, for example, raising
consumer confidence that deviant behavior by individual traders can be
better controlled; or because the costs to the industry arising from the
system are less than those incurred under a conventional publicly enforced
system. For the latter condition to be satisfied, the coordination costs
within the industry must be relatively low, thus implying a professional (or
trader) association with strong and effective powers over its members (and
the ability to control free-riders) (Wotruba 1997: 41) or at least the use
of “trustmarks,” which are used by consumers as a signal of reliability and
which can be withdrawn by the association in cases of default (Calliess
2008). Care must also be taken that the self-regulatory arrangements do not
fall foul of competition law.
Of course the powers exercised by the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) over their members must include the ability to impose sanctions
and, so that the cost advantages of the system can be maintained, without
proceedings in the ordinary courts. Now, just as with public enforcement
systems (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), SROs can, and indeed do, use a pyramid
of instruments, enabling them to respond with measures and sanctions of
increasing severity if traders continue to default on their obligations (Scott
2004: 453, 498). As well as advice and warnings, the sanctions can include
financial penalties and the suspension or expulsion from membership of the
association. In certain contexts, indeed, when such membership is vital for
the trader’s market reputation, these latter sanctions can generate high
values for D.
Nevertheless, the existence of instruments capable of generating adequate
deterrence does not of course necessarily imply that they will be used to
Faure et al. CURBING CONSUMER FINANCIAL LOSSES 173
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that end. The degree of commitment of an SRO to securing compliance will
vary according to the nature of the trade and its particular characteristics,
but some generalizations can be made (Hadfield 2001: 43–44). The SRO
will benefit from securing compliance from its members if an increase in
the demand of consumers for the products and services supplied by the
organization’s traders and bearing the trustmark justifies the costs of the
measures taken to secure compliance.22 The key variable affecting that
demand is reputation, not only that of the traders themselves, but also that
of the SRO’s ability adequately to police its members’ compliance with
their regulatory obligations. For that purpose, the enforcement mechanisms
must be seen to be effective, with some degree of transparency of the processes,
using, for example, modern technological means, such as the Internet.
In many areas of trade, the costs of coordination and of information
adequate to reassure consumers will be too high, relative to the benefits that
will accrue; and the deterrence model will fail. There are, however, insti-
tutional arrangements that can solve the problem while still retaining the
principal features of self-regulation. As one of us has argued elsewhere
(Ogus 1995: 97), it might be possible to establish competition between two
or more trustmarks within a particular trade. Such competition will
enhance the importance of maintaining the reputation of the trustmark and
will thus exert pressure on the SROs to secure adequate compliance with
regulatory obligations by its members. The alternative is to impose some
form of public accountability on the SRO. This can be done by a public agency
supervising the activities of SROs, but there are many other arrangements
with some coordination of public institutions and self-regulatory structures,
generally referred to as systems of co-regulation (Bartle and Vass 2007: 885).
VI. SANCTIONS AND PROCESSES: ADMINISTRATIVE V. CIVIL V. CRIMINAL
After a violation has been detected, and the agency decides that some form
of public enforcement is necessary, the question arises which sanction (and
concomitant process) should be invoked. The main possibilities are
administrative sanctions, civil law sanctions, and criminal sanctions, and we
will compare the relative cost effectiveness of each. Here we consider civil law
only as an instrument used by the agency against the trader; the possibility of
victims using their private rights will be addressed in Section VII.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
Although, in common law jurisdictions, traditionally the public enforcement
of regulation has relied predominantly on criminal law, in other countries,
administrative agencies have had wider powers to impose financial penalties,23
and, as we have already seen, there appears to be an increasing tendency to
adopt the device for some aspects of consumer protection. The appropriateness
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of the sanction, the form it should take, and the process by which it should
be imposed nevertheless remain important questions for debate (Macrory
2006: chap. 3).
The analytical framework based on deterrence theory would tend to
support conferring such power on agencies. For the condition of compliance
(U < qE + pD) to be met in typical cases the variable pD (the formal sanction
discounted by the probability of it being imposed) must be reasonably high
if it is to exceed the profit accruing from the contravention (U ), because qE
(the costs to the trader of being detected discounted by the probability of
this occurrence) is generally rather low. If financial penalties are only
available in the criminal or civil judicial processes, then given the significant
administrative costs of these processes (particularly the criminal processes if
there is a high threshold of evidence necessary to secure a conviction there),
the probability of the penalty being imposed (p) will be relatively low
(Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar 2004: 410; Van den Bergh 2007: 198).24 To
compensate for the low (p), the courts might impose a relatively large penalty.
But, although courts generally have the power to do this, in practice, they
are very reluctant to do so for minor trading offenses. In consequence, in
such systems, there is likely to be a problem of insufficient deterrence.
One means of addressing these issues may be the use of administrative
financial penalties. If, as is assumed here, these are readily imposed in cases
(notably involving second and repeat offenders) where deterrence is considered
to be important, then, in such cases, p will be high thus requiring only a
relatively modest penalty (D) for the compliance condition to be met. Moreover,
this is done with a considerable saving in administrative costs (Ca).
By way of qualification to this, it must be recognized that administrative
financial penalties are likely to give rise to higher error costs (Ce), because
without the higher evidentiary thresholds required for liability in the
criminal and civil justice systems, some administrative penalties will be
wrongly imposed—what we have already referred to as Type I errors. The
consequences of such errors can indeed be serious.25 They include not only
the financial and other costs inappropriately imposed on a trader, but also
the wider costs that result from overdeterrence, since the latter can have a
chilling effect on innovation and competition (Van den Bergh 2007: 199).
Therefore, in determining the appropriateness of a system of administrative
penalties, there is a need to weigh these costs against Type II error costs,
those arising from underdeterrence.
In relation to the design and operation of a system of administrative
financial penalties, the first question, that of terminology, might be considered
to be relatively trivial, but it is not unimportant. Given issues of account-
ability, the stigma associated with certain forms of condemnation, and
therefore also error costs, it appears preferable that the language typically
associated with the criminal process (for example, “fine” or “penalty”)
should be avoided. Hence, perhaps, language such as a “financial notice” or
“charge” is preferable.
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A second question is whether the financial penalty should be fixed or
variable, at the discretion of the agency (though to a specified limit). From
a deterrence perspective, there are clear advantages to the latter since the
amount imposed can be made to reflect relevant economic criteria, such as
the probability of detection and punishment and the amount of the social
loss caused, as well as the trader’s wealth and the profit likely to be derived
from the contravention (U ) (Becker 1968; Polinsky and Shavell 2000;
Kobayashi 2001: 715).26 So also the uncertainty generated by a discretionary
approach might add to the costs for the offender and thus aid deterrence.
On the other hand, fixed penalties can be processed at lower administrative
cost. In addition, the exercise of discretion regarding the amount might
encourage more appeals and/or create problems of divergence of approach
between different offices. On balance, it would seem that it is cost effective
for fixed penalties to be used only for very minor offences. For others, the
agency should have discretion, up to a limit, and to maintain some uniformity
of approach, decisions regarding the amount should be made at a central,
rather than a local, level.
As regards the procedure governing the financial penalty, there would
appear to be two main models (Macrory 2006).
i.  As in Belgium, a formal allegation of commission of a criminal offense is
made. The trader is nevertheless given (by the administrative agency) the
option of accepting a “proposal” for payment of a specified sum. If the
proposal is not accepted, or payment is not made within a prescribed
period, the trader will normally be prosecuted in a criminal court.
Conversely, on payment, the criminal charge lapses. (Note that this model
could be used in relation to civil, rather than criminal, proceedings.)
ii. As in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, if current legislative
proposals are implemented, the imposition of the administrative financial
penalty is independent of any criminal (or civil) process, but the trader has
the right to bring an appeal against the imposition to a tribunal or court.
The choice between the two models may depend on the related phenomena
of administrative costs (Ca) and error costs (Ce), and the incidence of these
costs may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, according to differences in
legal culture. Take first, model (i). Of course, if traders consider the decision to
be wrong, they can refuse the proposal, thus relying on adjudication in the
criminal (or civil) court. But there are other, cheaper ways of constraining
errors. For example, the administration can be required to provide a significant
amount of detail in the allegation, and the trader may be given the possibility
of disputing the content of the allegation before the formal imposition is
made. Then, as regards model (ii), in addition to the right of appeal, the
trader may be given the opportunity to respond (in writing) to a formal
allegation or to attend an oral hearing in which the allegation is contested.
Allowing the regulator to impose administrative penalties on a business
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tends to shift the burden of proof onto the business to prove its innocence.
Adequate evidentiary standards and procedures at the administrative stage
may, however, reduce this risk, as well as avoiding the increased costs
associated with an appeal.27
Clearly, the more elaborate the procedures, the higher the administrative
costs but also the lower the error costs. It is not easy to generalize on the
optimal trade-off between these two sets of costs, particularly because the
different styles of legal procedures generate different levels of costs in
different jurisdictions. However, the following predictions are proffered. In
jurisdictions, such as those in the common law world, associated with more
complex criminal law procedures and higher evidentiary thresholds for
criminal liability, model (ii), with a right of appeal to an administrative
tribunal, is likely to be less costly. Conversely, in jurisdictions where these
conditions do not apply, model (i) is likely to be more cost effective.
Other sanctions are often available to administrative agencies, including
the power to order that victims be compensated and the reimbursement of
(some of) the administrative costs of enforcement. In many jurisdictions an
administrative authority can issue a “cease offense” order, a prohibition order,
or an injunction. All of these have as goal to seek future compliance. Especially
in cases where excessive penalties may result in overdeterrence a cease and
desist order, which simply aims at the discontinuation of the infringement,
may be the preferred sanction (Van den Bergh 2007: 199–200).
In some cases administrative authorities may also have the power to
order the compensation of the victim or the reimbursement of (some of) the
administrative costs of enforcement. The amounts involved may, for deterrence
purposes, usefully complement financial penalties, should these be set at too
low a level. The appropriateness of adverse publicity (“naming and shaming”)
is debated in the literature. It is clear that the device can achieve additional
deterrence at relatively low cost (Morris and Tonry 1990; Buell 2006: 473–
537). On the other hand, offenders respond to the device in different ways
and targeting the sanction on those for whom the impact will be greatest
is not easy (Posner and Rasmusen 1999: 369–82; 2003: 2186–207). In any
event, it would seem to be inappropriate in the context of an administrative
decision, unless the latter is followed by a definitive ruling by a court (for
example, following an appeal). The reason is that error costs can escalate if
the agency has reached an incorrect decision, and reversing it on appeal will
not significantly reduce the harm arising from adverse publicity.
B. CIVIL SANCTIONS
The first issue is whether a civil court should have power to impose financial
penalties on traders guilty of contravening consumer protection regulation
and when in practice it should be exercised. There appears to be no strong
argument for denying this power to the civil court, although it may not
always be compatible with particular legal cultures. The question of when it
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should be exercised is more delicate and assumes particular importance if,
in a given jurisdiction, for one policy reason or another, administrative agencies
are not allowed themselves to impose financial penalties. It is assumed here
that financial and other penalties will, in any event, be available in criminal
proceedings. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of civil
and criminal financial penalties respectively?
In many jurisdictions, there will be significant differences in the evidentiary
threshold required as between civil and criminal liability. It may also be the
case that some degree of knowledge, intention, or blameworthiness must be
proved in the criminal context, while these conditions are not so stringent
in the civil justice context. These differences normally make the preparation
and adjudication of the criminal prosecution significantly more expensive
than the civil claim. For most cases, that should make the civil process more
cost effective than the criminal process. On the other hand, the increased
cost of criminal proceedings must be weighed against the possibility that
the imposition of the penalty there will have a greater deterrent effect. That
may be both because a criminal conviction carries a “stigma,” which may
exist to a lesser degree in civil condemnations (Van den Bergh 2007: 198),
and because the criminal court may have additional sanctions to secure
compliance, which are not available in civil proceedings (for example
imprisonment).
For jurisdictions where the cost of the criminal process significantly
exceeds that of the civil process, we can therefore reach the following
conclusion. If the administrative processes (which may or may not include a
financial penalty) fail to deter contraventions, the imposition of a civil
financial penalty may be a more cost effective means of enhancing compliance
than a criminal financial penalty, except where increased deterrence resulting
from the criminal process justifies the increased cost.
In many jurisdictions, civil proceedings are taken against a trader formally
to prohibit any continuing or further contraventions by means of an injunction,
an enforcement order or a cease offense order. In terms of deterrence, it is
not clear that this device is likely to be significantly more effective than
when an equivalent order is issued by an administrative agency, except to
the extent that the court setting has a psychological impact on the trader’s
propensity to comply or that the court injunction or order carries additional
penalties not initially available. The greater publicity attached to court orders
may also serve to deter other traders. But, because obtaining a civil justice
order is much more costly than issuing an administrative order, additional
arguments must be invoked to justify it.
One such argument may arise from a concern to prevent continuing
unlawful activity in the individual case rather than to deter more generally.
The power of the court to uphold the order by means of further sanctions,
such as imprisonment for contempt (common law jurisdictions), or accumulating
financial penalties (civil law jurisdictions) is available for this purpose. The
order may thus be effective to prevent serious amounts of harm that may
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arise from continuing or further contraventions. Even a harsh criminal justice
regime may “bite” too late to avoid these consequences. It is therefore
concluded that a civil injunction or enforcement order is justified where
continuing or further contraventions will lead to such a level of social harm
that prevention of the continuing unlawful activity is regarded, in the
individual case, as essential.
If, within the relevant jurisdiction, there is a system of trade licensing
operating in relation to the activity that gives rise to the contravention, then
it may be possible for a court to suspend or revoke the licence. This is a
severe penalty, as potentially it deprives traders of their chosen livelihood,
and, for deterrence purposes, it is likely to be much more effective as an
ultimate penalty than imprisonment, which, as we shall see, is the most
severe criminal law penalty. Although postimposition monitoring is neces-
sary to ensure that the trader does not continue the trading activity, it is
certainly a less costly option than imprisonment. Moreover, to traders it
may appear to be a more realistic possibility than imprisonment since the
reluctance of courts to imprison traders for relatively minor offenses is well
known. Of course, like imprisonment, a wrong decision can give rise to very
large error costs (Ce); therefore a court decision justifying the suspension or
revocation is essential.
In the absence of a licensing system, the equivalent outcome can be
secured by what is sometimes called “negative licensing” (Ogus 2004: 222),
a judicial order depriving the defendant of the right lawfully to practice a
specific trade or profession. Although such a “cease trading” order potentially
may be as powerful a sanction as the suspension or revocation of an actual
licence, there may be problems in defining the scope of the prohibition for
it to be legally effective. It is thus concluded that, as an ultimate sanction,
the suspension or revocation of a trading licence is likely to be much more
cost effective than imprisonment. The same may apply to a cease trading
order where the scope of the order can be defined with sufficient precision.
Finally, it is noted that the imposition of a criminal sanction may have
similar consequences for individuals, as in a number of jurisdictions there
will be associated restrictions on, for example, the ability to undertake
international travel, or to be a director of a publicly listed company.
C. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
In most legal systems, there is recognition that criminal law should continue
to play a role in relation to the enforcement of consumer protection legislation
and, moreover, that it is important, for general deterrence purposes, for the
criminal process to be seen to be used on occasions. Putting the same point
another way, if traders generally perceive the value of p (the probability of
a conviction) to be significantly higher than in reality is the case, there is no
reason to disturb this impression, if it can contribute to a higher level of
compliance (Hawkins 2005).28 Subject to that consideration, it is possible to
Faure et al. CURBING CONSUMER FINANCIAL LOSSES 179
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy
identify some characteristics of a case that are likely to render a criminal
prosecution cost effective.
The criminal justice system is necessary to induce compliance where
alternative systems provide, or are likely to provide, inadequate deterrence.
A simple, if also crude, indicator of inadequate deterrence is the existence
of a second or subsequent contravention. A plausible enforcement policy
might then be to engage in the high cost of a criminal prosecution only if a
trader is known already to have committed the same or an equivalent con-
travention. Such a policy might involve a presumption that, in the large
majority of cases, qE + pD from noncriminal processes would exceed U and
thus be adequate to induce compliance. In some individual cases, a second
or subsequent contravention might reveal that the presumption was not
justified, perhaps because of the size of U, perhaps because the trader was
insufficiently aware of the law and its consequences. The use of the criminal
justice system thus can involve a switch from general deterrence to individual
deterrence.
In accordance with the analysis above, this argument presupposes that
the costs to society arising from first-time contraventions are not so high as
to render deterrence of them a priority. It may be the case that some consumer
protection measures do not fall into this category: if so, there is a strong
argument for invoking the criminal justice process at an earlier stage. This
corresponds with general economic criteria for the use of the criminal law.
They predict that criminal law (rather than civil or administrative) may be
needed where the probability of detection is very low, and the gain to the
offender very high. In combination with a potential insolvency risk, this
means that either very high financial penalties should be applied or (in case
of a risk of insolvency) nonmonetary penalties. In both cases, the reduction
of error costs requires the application of the criminal law with its higher
evidentiary threshold (Bowles, Faure, and Garoupa 2008).
The character of the criminal justice system is assumed to be concerned
not only with deterring and repressing unlawful conduct, but also with
reflecting moral values within a given society regarding what is “wrongful.”
As such, as already noted, the evidentiary threshold and other conditions
for criminal liability (including possibly requirements of blameworthiness)
tend to be more exacting than those in other processes. They also typically
generate significantly higher administrative costs. The justification for the
special features of the criminal process is clear: the penalties that a criminal
court can impose, including imprisonment, can be most severe, and, in
addition, a stigma often attaches to those with criminal convictions
(Rasmusen 1996: 519; Funk 2004: 715). Both of these phenomena add
substantially to error costs in the event of wrongful convictions, and the
special features alluded to reduce the risk of such errors being made.
The principal enforcement function of the criminal justice system in
relation to consumer protection legislation can thus be considered to deploy
an ultimate set of sanctions appropriate for those traders who have not
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been, or will not be, deterred by other instruments (perhaps conveniently to
be referred to as “rogue traders”). Other factors that will be relevant in
determining whether criminal sanctions should be pursued include, for
example, the level of individual consumer detriment associated with the
conduct, whether the conduct and/or resultant detriment was widespread,
whether the conduct was deliberate or particularly negligent, and the level
of cooperation by the defendant with the investigation.
It is not easy to define exactly the characteristics of a rogue trader. They
should certainly include repeat offenders who cannot be deterred by other
means. But this should not exclude other characteristics that would reflect
the moral values of the criminal law. It might therefore be inappropriate to
attempt a more specific definition, other than that the conduct is regarded
as so repugnant as to justify a criminal prosecution even where this is
not justified by reference to deterrence arguments. And, of course, what
satisfies fiat test is likely to vary across countries, because, in different
jurisdictions, different views will be held on what kinds of conduct should
be the subject of criminal processes.
The above perspective of the function of the criminal law in relation to
the enforcement of consumer protection legislation has important implications
for the procedures and substance of the criminal justice process. If the requirements
of a prosecution authority, a high evidentiary threshold for liability, and
conditions of knowledge and blameworthiness are considered necessary to
reflect the moral values implicit in criminal justice, then these should be pre-
served for consumer protection legislation even though, for reasons given
above, they may not always be consistent with cost-effective deterrence.
What, then, of the sanctions that can be imposed by the criminal courts?
Fines are the criminal law equivalents to administrative financial penalties
and are frequently used for reasons that we explored in the administrative
sanction context. The principal advantage of the instrument is that the
amount can be determined by reference to the deterrence goal, so that when
discounted by the probability of the sanction being imposed (p) and when
added to qE, it exceeds the trader’s profits (U ) and is thus likely to induce
compliance, and at relatively low administrative cost.
The use of imprisonment may in extreme cases be rationalized by reference
to the moral outrage generated by the trader’s conduct or by the need to
protect the public against further wrongdoing generating large amounts of
damage. It is very difficult to justify its use as a cost-effective deterrent because
of the huge cost it imposes both on the taxpayer and on the convicted traders
themselves. Although imprisonment is sometimes resorted to when defendants
do not have the means or the willingness to pay a financial penalty, there are
other sanctions that are likely to be more cost effective in ensuring compliance.
Disgorgement of profits obtained by means of, or confiscation of, goods
connected in some way with the contravention may be impracticable in
relation to most consumer protection contraventions. But, where it is feasible,
it may help to solve the problem identified in the last paragraph, when a
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trader has insufficient wealth or available assets for an appropriate
financial penalty to be effective (Bowles, Faure, and Garoupa 2000: 537–49;
2005: 275–95).
VII. ACTIONS BY VICTIMS AND THIRD PARTIES
In some jurisdictions, the consumer victims and third parties are able
themselves to initiate, or participate in, administrative enforcement pro-
ceedings or criminal prosecutions. Quite apart from this, since many
contraventions of consumer protection regulation constitute also infringements
of the consumer victims’ private rights, especially those arising under contract
law, private law actions may also be available.29 The question thus arises as
to the extent to which actions by victims and third parties may contribute
to efficient enforcement policies.
Take first private rights. When these are enforced, or traders perceive
that such enforcement is plausible, this will enhance the inducement to
compliance supplied by the public system, in that it will add significantly
to qE + pD (Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson 1990: 888; Burrows 1999: 227;
Schmitz 2000: 371). There are, of course, advantages to private enforcement;
in particular, as we have seen, the aggrieved individual consumer stands
personally to benefit from a successful claim and thus has a motivation for
an efficient investment in enforcement, balancing the costs of taking action
against the private benefits, principally compensation, which should result
(Landes and Posner 1975: 1). This does not apply to a public official; on the
other hand, the private individual will not take into account the social
benefits of enforcement, notably deterring losses to other consumers (Van
den Bergh 2007: 187–89). Thus, while it is not difficult to justify the existence
of the private right regime as complementing the public law regime, where
there is likely to be repeated or widespread consumer losses, some degree of
public enforcement is necessary.
Moreover, in practice, a private right might not be enforced for a variety
of familiar reasons. The consumer might not know of the facts that constitute
the infringement, or that a private legal remedy is available, the claim may
be legally uncertain, or the trader may be insolvent or otherwise judgment
proof. Most significantly, the costs of obtaining adequate evidence of the
infringement and of instituting remedial proceedings may be too high,
relative to any compensation to which the infringement may give rise.
Of course, there are many general ways of enhancing consumer awareness
of rights and facilitating legal proceedings by consumers to overcome these
difficulties. They include not only the provision of institutions, such as
small claims courts, for the cheaper adjudication of disputes, but also, and
more controversially, the enabling of “class” or “group” legal actions, and
the granting of “punitive” or “triple” damages as compensation for the
infringement of certain private rights. Consideration of these devices goes
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beyond the scope of the present article, although, as the literature indicates,
the economic arguments for them are not always straightforward (Baldwin
1997; Boyd and Ingberman 1999: 47; Schaefer 2000: 183).
Less contentious, perhaps, are legal devices that, by linking private rights
to public law enforcement, can be used to facilitate private law claims, at
the same time enhancing compliance with the regulatory regime. There are
three main possibilities. First, contravention of consumer protection regulatory
regimes, leading to losses sustained by the consumer, might itself give rise
to a right under private law for compensation, in other words tortious or
delictual liability, obviating the need for the consumer to fulfill the normal
conditions of liability (for example, the existence of a “duty of care” or the
commission of a fault) (Faure and Van den Bergh 1987: 95; Ogus, 2006:
96–99). Second, the private claim might formally be joined to the public
law enforcement process, as, for example, with the “partie civile” familiar in
some European legal systems (Chiavario 2005: chap. 10), thus enabling the
consumer to rely on the evidence furnished for the public law action
(Hodges 2001: 321). Third, if the latter is not feasible, procedural law may
enable the consumer to use an administrative or civil determination or a
criminal conviction as evidence for the purpose of an independent private
law action.30 The availability of these devices is much dependent on legal
culture, particularly as regards civil procedure, but intuitively it may be
surmised that any costs to which they may give rise are outweighed by the
savings on information and administrative costs incurred by consumer-
victims and the increased deterrence to which they should give rise.
The extent to which consumer-victims, competitor traders, and other
third parties are allowed to contribute to public law enforcement by, for
example, initiating an administrative or criminal action against the trader,
varies greatly across jurisdictions.31 At first glance, there would appear to be
a strong cost-effective deterrence argument for allowing such participation: it
should raise the values of q and p, at no extra cost to taxpayers. And there
are concomitant advantages: by providing, in effect, a competing enforcement
agency, it can circumvent problems, including corruption, arising from the
“private capture” of public institutions and their officials (Van den Bergh
2007: 201–02).
On the negative side, however, third-party activism can defeat, or at least
undermine, sensible enforcement policy, where this dictates that a given
trader should not be the subject of formal enforcement procedures. We
have already seen32 that in some circumstances—notably in relation to first
offenders committing minor contraventions—taking administrative, civil, or
criminal proceedings may not be efficient. The motivation of the third party
is likely to differ from that of deterrence. In the case of a consumer it may
be to exact vengeance or at least to secure some compensation. In the case
of another trader, it may simply be to impose costs on a competitor and
thus seek to exclude the latter from the market (McAfee and Vakkur 2005:
37). These motivations, particularly as regards consumer compensation, are
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not always inappropriate, and it is a question of balancing their social value
against the additional costs to which they give rise.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our article deals with a topical issue in many jurisdictions, how a high level
of compliance with consumer protection legislation designed to prevent
financial losses can be secured. The starting point for our analysis is the
fact that across jurisdictions, there are apparently large differences in
enforcement models. In broad terms, we distinguish between jurisdictions
that rely respectively on administrative law, criminal law, or civil law as the
main instrument for compliance, as well as systems where enforcement is
mainly left either to consumers or consumer associations, or to an institution
like an ombudsman, and where, therefore, administrative and/or criminal
enforcement basically serves to back up the self-regulatory process.
Given these large differences, we use a theoretical framework based on
economic analysis of law to address some of the key policy options. The
economic framework (outlined in Section III) leads us to identify some key
elements of an enforcement regime and to indicate in what circumstances
one can expect a particular solution to be more or less cost effective.
We contend that a system of monitoring of trader’s behavior by public
authorities, sometimes supported by a system of risk assessment, is likely
to be cost effective when there is not within the jurisdiction a significant
culture of proactive complaints by consumers (or consumer associations) or
where the contravention itself is unlikely to be easily detected by consumers
themselves.
We then address the issue of postdetection enforcement discretion. In the
specific case of a contravention of regulation protecting the consumer
against financial losses, this usually relates to choosing between dismissing
a case (with or without a warning) and initiating procedures for penalties.
We argue that unless there are justified fears that officials might abuse
discretion, it is cost effective to provide officials with such a postdetection
discretion. Forcing agencies to prosecute in trivial cases may add
disproportionately to the administrative costs of enforcement. Limiting
action in relatively minor cases to, for example, a warning may enable the
agency to maximize enforcement efforts within the available budget.
Some jurisdictions adopt a strategy of relying heavily on the activism of
consumers themselves and/or representative consumer organizations,
sometimes supported by self-regulation and alternative dispute resolution.
The advantage of using these models where they exist is that it can substantially
save on administrative costs of enforcement and, at the same time, exploit
the incentive of the consumer victims to pursue their own case and thus
enforce the legislation. Whether these self-regulatory mechanisms provide
adequate deterrence depends largely upon the ability of the organization to
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impose sanctions and the possibility of applying pressure based on reputation
of a trustmark to secure compliance from its members.
When a violation has been detected and enforcement is necessary, we
argue that there are powerful cost-effectiveness arguments for allowing
administrative agencies themselves to impose some form of financial
penalty. The effectiveness of this sanction may, to a large extent, depend
upon the judicial and administrative framework within the specific jurisdic-
tion. A major advantage of the administrative financial penalty is that the
costs of its imposition can be relatively low, certainly when compared to the
criminal sanction. Thus, since also the probability of its imposition can be
relatively high (given lower thresholds, e.g., of proof), the sanction itself
need not be as large as in the criminal case to achieve effective deterrence.
However, the flipside from the lower administrative costs resulting from a
low-cost procedure is that error costs may be substantial. Therefore, we
argue that so-called “naming and shaming” sanctions should not be used in
this context given the danger of high error costs, unless the responsibility of
the trader for the contravention has first been confirmed by a tribunal or
court.
Civil financial penalties can, in theory, also be used even though not many
jurisdictions seem to use them. When, however, a contravention is continuing,
we argue that an injunction or enforcement order may be justified. This is
more particularly the case when the contravention will lead to such a level
of social harm that prevention of the continuing unlawful activity in the
individual case is regarded as essential.
Given the high costs of criminal procedure, it should come as no surprise
that from a cost-effectiveness perspective, we contend that criminal prosecutions
should be reserved for repeat offenders who cannot be deterred by other
instruments, as well as for those whose conduct is regarded as so repugnant
morally as to justify such proceedings being taken, irrespective of deterrence
considerations. The sanction to be imposed (in administrative, civil, or
criminal proceeding) is preferably the financial penalty to be determined by
reference to the nature of the contravention and the trader’s circumstances
(inter alia taking into account the profit gained as a result of the contravention).
In many cases involving financial losses to consumers, a financial penalty
may suffice to reach deterrence. However, where that penalty is insufficiently
large for deterrence purposesfi (more particularly where the injurer’s wealth
may be limited and hence an insolvency problem arises) nonmonetary sanc-
tions should be used to increase the likelihood of compliance. This could be
compensation orders, orders for the recovery of administrative costs, the
disgorgements of profits, or a policy of naming and shaming. Given the
high costs, we argue that imprisonment should only be used as an ultimate
sanction when deterrence cannot be reached through other means. However,
other nonmonetary sanctions such as the suspension or revocation of a trading
licence or a cease trading order (if applicable in the specific jurisdiction) may
be more cost effective.
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Finally, we consider possibilities of using public law determinations that
a trader has contravened consumer protection regulation to facilitate the
enforcement of private rights by a victim who suffered a loss as a result of
the violation. We also discuss the extent to which third parties should be
able to initiate administrative or criminal actions against the trader. We
consider that such action should be subject to approval by the relevant
administrative agency primarily because the motivation of the third party
(e.g., a competing trader) may diverge from the goal of cost-effective deterrence.
Our article merely discusses the enforcement of consumer legislation aiming
at the prevention of financial losses. Similar questions concerning the
relative effectiveness of the various enforcement mechanisms that we have
discussed in this article also arise in other areas such as competition law.
Although there are some features that are shared by consumer protection
and competition law, there are also very important differences, not the least
being the characteristics of law-breaking firms, of their victims, and of the
losses that result.
The question also arises whether the indicators of cost-effective deterrence
that we provide in this article are able also to explain some of the differences
between the approaches that we found and described in Section II. To some
extent, we assume this to be the case. Some legal systems may, for example,
make use of a reactive approach to monitoring and may largely rely on self-
regulatory mechanisms and consumer complaints simply because, in that
particular jurisdiction, there is a culture of consumer activism. However we
are, of course, aware of the fact that the differences between the jurisdictions
may also reflect varying circumstances and, in particular, different legal
traditions and cultures. If that is the case, it is highly unlikely that any single
model of practices and procedures will provide the most cost effective
means of achieving a high degree of compliance.
Our study should therefore be seen as an attempt not to identify a single
optimal solution for the enforcement of relevant consumer regulation, but
rather to provide an analytical framework for addressing the key policy
options. We hope that by identifying the key variables that determine the
cost effectiveness of various enforcement actions, we can help the policymaker
to identify and understand the interaction of key variables that impact on
the choice of enforcement practices and procedures. Moreover, it is important
to reiterate that this article deals only with regulation protecting the consumer
against potential financial losses. Regulation dealing with other kinds of
losses (e.g., personal injury damage) would have different implications for
the cost effectiveness of the various policy options.
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NOTES
1. See OECD, “From Red Tape to Smart Tape: Administrative Simplification in
OECD Countries” (2003); U.S. Office of Management and Budget, “Stimulating
Smarter Regulation (Report to Congress, 2002); Canadian External Advisory
Committee on Smarter Regulation, “Smarter Regulation: A Regulatory Strategy
for Canada” (Report to the Government of Canada, 2004); UK Better Regulation
Task Force, “Less is More” (2005); European Commission, “Strategic Review of
Better Regulation in the European Union” {COM(2006) 690 final} {COM(2006)
691 final}.
2. The report was published as Best Practices for Consumer Policy: Report on the
Effectiveness of Enforcement Regimes, DSTI/CP(2006)21/Final. Available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/7/37863861.doc.
3. Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill, 2007.
4. For example, see Australia (Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled
Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties (2002) and Ministerial
Council of Consumer Affairs, Civil Penalties for Australia’s Consumer Protection
Provisions, Discussion Paper September 2005 (2005)); Netherlands (Expertisecentrum
rechtshandhaving, Monitoring beleidsinstrumentele wetgeving (1997) and
Consumentenautoriteit, Consultatiedocument Oktober 2007 (2007)); and the
United States (Simpson 2002); see, more generally, OECD, Reducing the Risk of
Policy Failure: Challenges for Future Compliance (2000).
5. For a similar exercise in classification, see DTI (2003).
6. Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill, 2007.
7. This is an order to (1) establish a compliance program, (2) establish an education
and training program, or (3) direct a person to revise the internal operations of
his/her business; see Trade Practices Act §86C.
8. The author provides more information on the Scandinavian model.
9. U may, of course, vary significantly across relevant traders. This, as we shall see
in the later analysis, has important implications for targeting of the enforcement
framework.
10. This is a simplified version of Becker’s (1968) model. For more information on
this model and the literature that followed it, see Eide (2000: 346–51) and Polinsky
and Shavell (2000). See also Posner (1985) and Hylton (2005).
11. Indeed, with regard to criminal conviction, Funk (2004) argues that stigma is an
important crime deterrent. Also Baldwin (2004) and Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly
(2005) provide empirical evidence suggesting that market reputation losses following
criminal proceedings may have more impact on firms than the penalty itself.
12. However, these assumptions may be unrealistic for many individuals contemplating
“mainstream” crimes, such as assault and theft.
13. Note again that, in our study, we considered areas of consumer protection regulation
dealing only with financial losses; thus we exclude social cost which may arise
from sickness and injury.
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14. Stigler deals with cost–benefit analysis and enforcement.
15. The extent to which account should also be taken of the costs imposed by the
penalties and procedures on traders who have contravened the law is debatable.
After all, these costs are the consequence of an illegal activity and the deterrence
system depends on them facing such costs.
16. We mean before 2007 when a Consumer Authority was instituted.
17. These authors deal with the likelihood of collective private enforcement of consumer
claims in general.
18. Officials recognized that this was indeed a weakness of the Dutch enforcement system.
19. According to Van den Bergh (2007), this is therefore the main argument in favor
of public enforcement of this type of infringements of consumer laws.
20. For example, in Australia and Belgium, targeting takes place without relying on
formal models.
21. See May and Winter (1999) for an example from the environmental area.
22. The costs of lost reputation to the industry, thus motivating effective self-regulation,
may be enhanced by the threat of some residual intervention by a public regulator.
23. European Commission, The System of Administrative and Penal Sanctions in the
Member States of the European Communities (1994, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, Brussels).
24. See generally Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar (2004: 410), and, with respect to
consumer legislation, Van den Bergh (2007: 198).
25. There is another reason for being concerned with high type I errors. If individuals,
as a result of error, have a greater likelihood (or even certainty) of facing a fine,
they may well choose the violation. Hence, type I errors can increase the set of
individuals willing to breach the law.
26. On the dangers of over-deterrence, see Kobayashi (2001: 715).
27. There may be more differences between models (i) and (ii) if one were to incor-
porate potentially collusive behavior by agencies. Model (i) is potentially more
prone to abusive rent extraction by the agency than model (ii). Hence, if the
possibility of opportunistic behavior by bureaucrats is included, this may also
affect the choice between models (i) and (ii).
28. The empirical work of Keith Hawkins (1984, 2005) underscores the importance
of this point.
29. In this article we consider private rights as complementing a regulatory regime.
We do not deal with the question whether, if only one type of regime is to be used,
which of these is economically preferable. On this, see especially Shavell (1984:
357), Hylton (2002: 515), Faure (2007: 399–415), and Van den Bergh (2007: 186).
30. See, for example, for England and Wales, Civil Evidence Act 1968, §11.
31. See our OECD report: Report on the Effectiveness of Enforcement Regimes,
DSTI/CP(2006)21/Final, Table 7. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/
7/37863861.doc.
32. See Section IV.
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